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In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains 
have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product 
brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied 
brands continue to set independently. In this paper, we model this bundling using 
Hotelling competition between two brands of each product. We show that a pair 
of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of firms 
who do not bundle and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from 
the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling 
arrangements, there are no beneficiaries (the effect on equilibrium profits is zero) 
and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub-optimal brand mix. If 
the two separate products are owned by the same firm, additional complications 
arise although if both product sets are integrated, no bundled discounts are 
offered in equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 
L13, L41. 
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1. Introduction 
Bundling has long been used as a business strategy and the benefits of bundling, 
particularly for a price discriminating monopoly selling complementary products, are 
well understood in economics.1 An increasingly popular business strategy, however, 
involves firms in oligopolistic environments encouraging customer loyalty by offering 
interlocking discounts between particular brands of seemingly unrelated products. If 
customers buy one product then they can receive a discount if they buy a particular brand 
of some other product. The earliest examples of this strategy are reward points offered by 
credit card companies that can be redeemed as discounts or free offers from particular 
airlines, hotel chains, car rental companies or in some cases car manufacturers.2 More 
recently, supermarket chains in the U.K., France and Australia have offered their grocery 
customers discount vouchers that can be redeemed when purchasing gasoline from 
particular retail petroleum chains.  
At first blush, these discounts might appear to involve the bundling of 
complementary goods. Intensive credit card users may tend to be frequent travellers and 
those with large supermarket expenses also may tend to consume relatively more petrol. 
However, recent bundling by supermarkets and credit card companies has involved 
exclusive brand-specific relationships. For example, gasoline discount coupons offered 
                                                 
1 For example see Stigler 1968, Adams and Yellen 1976, Schalensee 1982 and McAfee, McMillan and 
Whinston 1989.  
2 Both GM and Ford have adopted such ‘co-branding.’ See Clark (1997) for an early review of these 
strategies. 
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by supermarkets are only redeemable at specific branded petroleum outlets. They cannot 
be redeemed on just any gasoline purchase. While a consumer’s demand for groceries 
might be related to their purchase of gasoline, there is no particular reason to expect that 
a customer of a specific supermarket chain will gain any intrinsic value by also buying 
gasoline at a particular petroleum chain. For this reason, traditional explanations of 
bundling based on relationships between demands for alternative products are inadequate 
to explain this trend in exclusive co-branding. 
Two other features also characterise recent bundling in credit cards and 
supermarkets. First, the bundling has occurred for both horizontally integrated and non-
integrated (and indeed otherwise-unrelated) firms. For example, in the U.S., Walmart has 
experimented with bundled discounts by owning its own petrol pumps. In contrast, the 
Albertson supermarket chain teamed up with Arco (who are owned by BP Amoco) to 
offer loyalty discounts (Barrionuevo and Zimmerman, 2001). Similar mixtures of 
bundled discounts by integrated and by non-integrated and otherwise unrelated firms 
have arisen in Europe and Australia. 
Second, the bundling involves a set discount (usually for one of the products) that 
is offered regardless of the prices offered for the particular products. That is, mileage 
redemption rates from credit card use are fixed in advance even as interest rates and 
airline ticket prices change. Similarly, supermarket basket and petrol pump prices change 
on a daily basis whereas the bundled discount may be unchanged for months or years. 
This inflexibility of discounting stands in contrast to the usual assumption in the 
economics literature where firms – if they opt to have both bundled and separate prices – 
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choose both sets of prices simultaneously.3 Here, however, the bundled discount is 
chosen prior to the actual store or pump prices that emerge in competition for consumers. 
For this reason, the bundled discount represents an ex ante commitment to the price for 
customer loyalty. 
In this paper we model the interaction between four producers of two products to 
investigate the consequences of bundled discounts in an oligopoly setting. Our model is 
an extension of the standard differentiated goods framework used, for example, by 
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Denicolo (2000) and Nalebuff (2003), and is designed to 
capture the key features described above. The products are unrelated in that both 
consumer demands and production costs for the two products are independent. Each 
product is produced by two firms and we explore situations where firms are either 
unrelated except for the bundling or are horizontally integrated. Pairs of firms may 
negotiate to set a bundled discount across the two products and to share the costs of that 
discount, with any discount being a publicly observable commitment that is set prior to 
any competition for customers.  
We show how offering a bundled discount for two otherwise unrelated products 
creates a strategic interdependence between those products. For example, if only one pair 
of firms offers a bundled discount then in the eyes of the customers those two products 
are like complements. A lower price for one of the products raises demand for that 
product and, through the discount, also raises demand for its bundled pair. Importantly, 
bundling by one pair of firms also creates a strategic interdependence between the prices 
                                                 
3 For example see Chen (1997). 
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of the other two products – even if those firms offer no equivalent bundled discount. A 
rise in the price of one unbundled product increases consumption of the bundled pair and 
reduces demand for the other unbundled product.  
By creating an externality in pricing between otherwise unrelated firms, bundling 
allows firms to alter the intensity of price competition.4 If only one pair of independent 
firms sets a bundled discount then it gains a strategic advantage through price 
discrimination, similar to that shown by McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989). The 
discount leads to an aggressive pricing response by the pair of firms that do not offer the 
bundled discount, but this response is tempered by the inability to coordinate prices. 
Unilateral bundling is profitable in this situation as the increase in the intensity of 
competition is muted by the coordination failure. While the co-branded firms increase 
profits, both the profits of the other firms and social welfare fall.  
If both pairs of firms can establish a bundled discount but are otherwise unrelated, 
then both pairs will co-brand, even though, in equilibrium, there is no increase in profits. 
Retaliatory co-branding is an effective competitive response to bundled discounts offered 
by other firms, albeit only returning profits to their pre-bundling levels. At the same time, 
mutual co-branding greatly diminishes social welfare. The market is divided into two 
mutually exclusive sets of customers who buy both products of one pair of firms. The 
bundled discounts are sufficiently high so that even customers who otherwise would have 
a strong preference for unpaired products find it in their interest to buy a bundled pair. 
                                                 
4 Issues of pricing between complementary products has been analyzed, for example, by Economides and 
Salop (1992). A key feature of bundled discounts, however, is that this complementarity is endogenously 
created by the discount between otherwise unrelated products. 
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The key role of price competition and pricing coordination is shown when we 
allow for horizontal integration between firms. As Matutes and Regibeau (1992) show, 
bundled discounting is mutually unprofitable in duopoly with full market coverage. We 
show this result but also show how it critically depends on integration. One integrated 
firm facing a pair of non-integrated firms finds bundling profitable while co-branding is 
never profitable for the non-integrated pair. The non-integrated pair is unable to 
coordinate specific product pricing making them ‘soft’ from the perspective of the 
integrated firm. Retaliatory bundling is not profitable for the non-integrated firms due to 
the aggressive pricing response by their integrated rival. However, retaliatory horizontal 
integration can be a useful strategic response; eliminating bundling in equilibrium. 
The analysis presented below significantly extends the existing bundling 
literature. Other related papers tends to focus on duopoly (for example Matutes and 
Regibeau, 1992), albeit sometimes with a competitive fringe (Chen, 1997). While 
Denicolo (2000) considers three firms, similar to our situation with one integrated pair, 
his focus is on compatibility rather than bundling. In contrast, our model shows the key 
role played by the endogenous pricing interdependence created by co-branding and 
bundled discounts. In particular, we highlight the potential adverse welfare outcomes that 
can arise through the type of bundling between otherwise unrelated firms and products 
that has been growing in popularity in a variety of countries. 
2. Model Set-Up 
We model the interaction between four firms that produce and sell two products, 
X and Y. Firms AX and BX produce X and firms AY and BY produce Y. There are no costs 
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associated with the production of either product and firms are otherwise symmetric. Let 
i
nP  and 
i
nQ  be the (headline) price charged and quantity sold by firm ni for product i. 
There is a population of customers who may choose to buy the products. 
Depending on the prices and their preferences, a consumer may choose to buy one unit of 
one product, one unit of both products or neither product. Consumers also choose which 
firms to buy from. We use a standard ‘linear city’ model to capture consumers’ 
preferences of each product. Thus, with regards to product X, consumers can be viewed 
as arrayed along the unit interval. A particular consumer’s location on this line is denoted 
by x, with firm AX is located at x = 0 and firm BX is located at x = 1. If a consumer located 
at x purchases from firm A then that consumer gains net utility, XX Av P xd− − , where Xv  
is the consumer’s gross value of product and d is the disutility associated with the 
difference between the purchased product and the consumer’s most preferred product. If 
that same consumer purchases from firm B then that consumer gains net utility, 
( )1XX Bv P x d− − − . We assume that Xv  is the same for all customers and is at least equal 
to 2d so that in equilibrium all customers will choose to buy one (but only one) unit of 
product X. 
We use an analogous structure for good Y, where customers’ preferences are 
denoted by their location y along a unit interval with firm AY located at y = 0 and firm BY 
located at y = 1. Thus, customers can be viewed as arrayed over a unit square according 
to their preferences. For simplicity, we normalise the population of customers to unity. 
Again, we assume that all customers value Y sufficiently high so that all customers will 
buy one (but only one) unit of this product.   
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The products are independent in the sense that customers’ preferences for the two 
products are independent. Thus, if ( , )G x y  is the joint distribution function of customers 
over preferences for the two products, we can represent G by ( , ) ( ) ( )G x y f x h y=  where f 
and h are the distributions of customers over preferences for product X and Y 
respectively. Thus, there is no reason why a customer who tends to prefer firm AX for 
product X will tend to prefer either firm AY or firm BY for product Y. Similarly, there is no 
reason why a customer who tends to prefer firm AY for product Y will tend to prefer either 
firm AX or firm BX for product X. This is a reasonable assumption, for example, with 
regards to consumers’ preferences for particular supermarket and retail petrol chains. For 
ease of analysis we assume that both f and h are uniform distributions.  
Firms simultaneously set the prices for their products, inP . However, firms might 
also agree to a ‘bundled’ discount γn for consumers who purchase X from nX and Y from 
nY. Thus, if a consumer buys both products from AX and AY, that customer pays 
X Y
A A AP P γ+ − . The bundled discount is like a voucher that the consumer receives when 
purchasing product X from AX that enables that consumer to a discount of γA when that 
customer also purchases Y from AY. Each consumer can only receive one discount. We 
are interested in the profitability of relatively small discounts; thus, we assume that the 
discount is non-negative but no greater than the price of a single product. Thus, we 
assume that [0, ]n dγ ∈ .5 
                                                 
5 As we show below, the equilibrium price for each good in the absence of any bundled discount is given 
by d. 
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In setting the discount, we assume that firms nX and nY are natural partners and 
that only a single exclusive relationship between producers of either product are possible. 
The partnered firms choose their discount to maximise their expected joint profits. This 
would arise naturally from any efficient bargaining game (such as Nash bargaining) 
where ex ante (lump sum) side payments are possible. Nonetheless, ex post, the costs of 
the discount might be shared between the two firms. We assume that firm nX bears a 
proportion [0,1]Xα ∈  of the discount in any relationship. We will explore how αX might 
be set so as to maximise the joint expected profits of the partners. 
The timing of the game played between the firms is as follows: 
1. Firms simultaneously agree to their bundled discount if any. 
2. Given the bundled discount(s), all firms simultaneously announce their prices.  
3. Given prices and any bundled discounts, customers decide where to make their 
purchases. Firms receive payments and profits. 
A key assumption here is that firms find it easier to change their retail prices than their 
agreed bundled discount. This assumption contrasts with the prior literature on bundling 
and compatibility. In that literature, while some choices may be made initially by firms, 
such as to whether to make their products compatible or not, the prices of individual and 
bundled products are determined simultaneously (Matutes and Regibeau, 1992; Chen, 
1997). Here, the discount to the bundled product is set first. Hence, that discount is a 
commitment that impacts upon later price competition.  
Equilibrium without Bundling 
As a benchmark, suppose that no bundled agreements have been made (i.e., 
0A Bγ γ= = ). Consumers will make their choice over the two products independently. 
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The marginal consumer for product X will be located at xˆ  such that 
ˆ ˆ(1 )X XX A X Bv P dx v P d x− − = − − −  or ( )1 12 2ˆ X XB Adx P P= + − . Thus, all consumers located at 
ˆx x≤  purchase X from firm AX while all other consumers purchase from firm BX. 
Similarly, for product Y, all consumers located at ( )1 12 2ˆ Y YB Ady y P P≤ = + −  purchase from 
firm AY while all other consumers purchase from firm BY. Each firm simultaneously and 
independently sets prices to maximise profits. For example, 
( )1 12 2ˆ ˆarg max ( )XAX X X XA A B AdPP P P P= + − . Notice that this does not depend upon the prices 
charged for product Y.  
In the unique Nash equilibrium, prices are given by ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆX X Y YA B A DP P P P d= = = = , with 
one half of consumers buying product X from firm AX with the rest buying this product 
from firm BX. Similarly, for product Y. Thus, 12ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
X X Y Y
A B A DQ Q Q Q= = = = . Given this, it is 
easy to see that each firm makes profits of 12 d  but, more significantly, this outcome 
maximises social welfare in that each consumer purchases both products from their 
nearest respective retailer (see Figure 1). 
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3. Unilateral Bundling by Independent Firms 
We begin by considering the effects of bundling by one coalition of producers. Suppose 
that firms AX and AY unilaterally decide to offer a bundled discount on their products, but 
that firms BX and BY do not set a discount. Thus, we fix 0Bγ = .  
If 0Aγ > , the resulting division of consumers is as in Figure 2. Given retail prices 
and the bundled discount, a consumer who would have purchased product Y from AY and 
X from BX might now purchase product X from AX as well. Given that they are going to 
buy Y from AY anyway, the effective price of product X from A is reduced by γA. Thus, a 
consumer who is located at ˆy y≤  and at ( )1 1 12 2 2ˆX XB A A Ad dx P P xγ γ≤ + − + = +  will 
0 
1 
1 
Figure 1: No Bundling 
X from AX 
Y from BY 
y 
x 
X from AX 
Y from AY 
X from BX 
Y from BY 
X from BX 
Y from AY 
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purchase both X and Y from AX and AY. A similar increase in sales of Y from firm AY also 
holds. Finally, some consumers who, in the absence of the discount would have bought 
neither product from firms AX and AY will now find it in their interest to do so. Any 
consumer with preferences for X and Y such that ˆx x> , ˆy y>  but 12ˆ ˆ Adx y x y γ+ ≤ + +  
will now prefer to buy both products from AX and AY even though in the absence of the 
bundled discount they would buy neither product from them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The existence of a bundled discount alters the nature of price competition by 
endogenously creating interdependence between the otherwise-independent customer 
demands. To see this, note that sales for each firm are given by: 
 ( ) ( )( ) 221 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 8A AX X X Y YA B A B Ad d d dQ P P P Pγ γ= + − + + − +  
 ( ) ( )( ) 221 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 8A AY Y Y X XA B A B Ad d d dQ P P P Pγ γ= + − + + − +  
 ( ) ( )( ) 221 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 8A AX X X Y YB A B B Ad d d dQ P P P Pγ γ= + − − + − −  
 ( ) ( )( ) 221 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 8A AY Y Y X XB A B B Ad d d dQ P P P Pγ γ= + − − + − −  
0 
1 
1 
Figure 2: A Bundles 
X from AX 
Y from BY 
y 
x 
X from AX 
Y from AY 
X from BX 
Y from BY 
X from BX 
Y from AY 
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In the absence of bundling, demand for units of X sold by AX only depend on XAP  and 
X
BP . With bundling, the demand for X sold by AX , 
X
AQ , depends on both the prices for 
product X and the prices for product Y. A decrease in YAP , given 
Y
BP , leads to more sales 
of Y by AY and this increases the number of customers able to benefit from the bundled 
discount by also purchasing units of X from AX. As such, a fall in YAP  relative to 
Y
BP  
increases the demand for X sold by AX. In contrast, a rise in YAP  relative to 
Y
BP  lowers the 
demand for X sold by AX. A similar relationship holds between prices XAP  and 
X
BP  and 
the demand for Y sold by AY.  
While bundling by firm A creates a dependency between the prices of AX and AY it 
also creates a dependency between the prices of the non-bundled products. Sales of firm 
BX, XBQ , also depend on the prices of Y-sellers. Thus a fall in 
Y
BP  relative to 
Y
AP makes BX 
better off by increasing its sales. A similar relationship holds between XBP  and the sales 
of AY. The creation of these pricing externalities between otherwise independent products 
by bundled discounts is a key factor in our analysis. 
We denote the total number of consumers who purchase from both AX and AY (and 
so receive the discount Aγ ) by DA where: 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 221 1 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 2 81A AX X Y Y Y Y X XA B A D A D A B Ad d d d dD P P P P P P P Pγ γ= + − + − + + − + − + . 
The individual profits of firms AX and AY are X X XA A A X A AP Q Dπ α γ= −  and 
( )1Y Y YA A A X A AP Q Dπ α γ= − −  respectively. The profits of firms BX and BY are X X XB B BP Qπ =  
and Y Y YB B BP Qπ =  respectively. The joint profits of AX and AY is X X Y YA A A A A AP Q P Q D γ+ − .  
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Proposition 1. Regardless of the exact level of bundled discount, the (joint) profit 
maximising level of Xα  for firms AX and AY is equal to 0.5. 
PROOF: Each firm unilaterally sets its own price to maximise own profit, given 
Aγ  and Xα  then the equilibrium prices are given by:  
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
4 2 2 3 4 3
3 2
2144 12 2 4 2 2 1 3 24 2 1
144 4 3 2
2 X X X X X X
X X
XX
A
d d d d
d d
P
γ α α γ α α γ α α γ α
γ α α
+ − + − + + − + +
+ − +
+  =
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
4 2 2 3 4 3
3 2
2 2144 12 4 2 2 24 2
144 4 3 2
4 1 1 3 3X X X X X
X X
X XY
A
d d d d
d d
P
γ α α γ α α γ α α γ α
γ α α
+ + + −
+ − +
− + + − + − −  =
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
4 2 2 3 4 3
3 2
2144 4 2 6 4 2 1 3 24 1
144 4 3 2
X X X X X X
X X
XX
B
d d d d
d d
P
γ α α γ α γ α α γ α
γ α α
α+ − + − + − +
+ − +
+ − −  =   
( ) ( )
( )( )
4 2 2 3 4 3
3 2
2 2144 4 2 4 2 24
144 4 3 2
5 3 1X X X X X
X X
X XY
B
d d d d
d d
P
γ α α γ α α γ α α γα
γ α α
+ + + −
+ − +
− − + + −  =  
Substituting these prices into quantities and then into profit, the equilibrium value 
of joint profit to firms AX and AY is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
8 7 6 2 5 3 4 4
3 5 2 6 7 8 2
23 2 2
20736 3456 576 19 144 4 3 24 5 91
12 4 43 20 4 11 27 22 2 5 18 1 2 2 1
16 36 2 3
X X X
X X
d d d d d
d d d
d d
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ α α α
γ α α
 + + Λ− − Λ+ − Λ−  − Λ Λ− + − Λ Λ− + − Λ Λ+ − − − + + 
+ + −
 
where ( )1X Xα αΛ = − .  
Maximising the joint profits with respect to Xα  gives a relevant solution 
at 0.5Xα = . Further, remembering that dγ ≤ , it is easy to confirm that the 
second order conditions on the joint profit equation are negative at 0.5Xα =  for 
all feasible discounts.  
 
As noted above, we would expect AX and AY to negotiate both a level of bundled discount 
and a sharing rule for the discount to maximise their joint profits. Proposition 1 shows 
that, regardless of the actual bundled discount, joint profit maximisation involves an 
equal sharing of the cost of the bundled discount. This result is intuitive given the 
symmetry of both the firms’ production functions and consumers’ preferences.  
Given 12Xα =  and the level of bundled discount γA, firms individually set prices 
to maximise their own profits. The equilibrium prices are: 
2 2
2 2
(0.0611111 0.025463 )1
3 20 0.173611
ˆ ˆ A A A
A
dX Y
A A A d d
P P dγ γ γγγ −−= = + + +  and 
2 2
2 2
(0.0152778 0.00636574 )1
12 20 0.173611
ˆ ˆ A A A
A
dX Y
B B A d d
P P dγ γ γγγ −−= = − + + + . 
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It is easy to see that each iBP  is decreasing and each 
i
AP  is increasing in γA. However, 
X Y
A A AP P γ+ −  is decreasing in γA. As the bundled discount rises, each of firms AX and AY 
has an incentive to raise their individual prices. However, overall, an increase in the 
bundled discount reduces the total price associated with the bundled products so that 
consumers who do in fact buy the bundle are made better off. A rise in the bundled 
discount raises the pricing pressure on firms BX and BY and they respond by lowering 
their prices. Again, consumers who buy both products from these firms are made better 
off by the fall in prices even though they do not receive a bundled discount. This is 
reflected in the ranking of price combinations that consumers can pay for the two 
products. In equilibrium, for 0Aγ > : 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2X Y Y X X Y X YA B A B B B A A AP P P P d P P P P γ+ = + > > + > + − . 
Relative to the benchmark with no bundled discount, consumers of the bundled product 
pay a reduced price as do those who do not consume products from AX and AY. However, 
consumers who purchase one product from AX and AY are worse off when there is a 
bundled discount. Moreover, it is easy to see from Figure 2, that overall social welfare is 
reduced as there are some consumers who no longer consume their nearest product.  
What will be AX and AY’s choice of γA? Maximising ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆX X Y YA A A A A AP Q P Q D γ+ −  with 
respect to γA gives ˆ 0.576578A dγ = . This, in turn, implies that: 
ˆ ˆ 1.22528X YA AP P d= =  and ˆ ˆ 0.964472X YB BP P d= =  
ˆ ˆ 0.517764X YA AQ Q= =  and ˆ ˆ 0.482236X YB BQ Q= =  
0.521545
X YA A
dπ π= =  and 0.465103
X YB B
dπ π= =  
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This outcome is summarised in the following proposition.  
Proposition 2. If all firms are non-integrated and only two firms can offer a bundled 
discount then, in equilibrium, relative to the situation without bundling: 
(a) The (headline) prices for the bundling firms will rise and the prices for the other 
firms will fall; 
(b) Profits of the bundling firms rise while profits for each of the other firms fall and 
total industry profits fall;  
(c)  Consumers who either purchase the bundle or make no purchases from the 
bundling firms pay a lower total price while other consumers pay a higher total 
price;  
(d) Social welfare falls as more than half of the consumers of product i purchase 
that product from firm Ai for i = X, Y.  
Proposition 2 shows that two firms selling otherwise unrelated products to the same 
consumer base have an incentive to offer a bundled discount for their products. This 
discount has the effect of increasing their total sales and profits by allowing them to price 
discriminate between consumer types; especially those who strongly prefer one of their 
products but not the other. In this sense, the outcome here is similar to the case of 
monopoly bundling analysed by McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989). However, our 
result holds for oligopolistic competition and is valid even for relatively intense 
competition as d approaches zero. 
4. Bilateral Bundling by Independent Firms 
Unilateral bundling benefits the firms who initiate the bundling but harms other 
firms. For this reason it is natural at ask whether the other pair of firms wish to follow 
suit and also offer a bundled discount or not? If there is bilateral bundling, how does this 
affect prices, sales and welfare in equilibrium? In this section, we answer these questions 
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by considering the equilibrium choices of ( , )A Bγ γ  when two partnering arrangements are 
possible.  
Suppose that both the coalitions of firms A and the coalitions of firms B 
simultaneously announce their bundled discounts, then each firm simultaneously and 
independently announces its price.6 The equilibrium outcome is characterised in the 
following proposition.  
Proposition 3. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium involves all consumers receiving 
a bundled discount, ˆ ˆA B dγ γ= =  with each firm’s profits and output the same as the case 
where there are no bundled discounts.  
PROOF: Let A adγ =  and B bdγ = where both a and b are elements of [0,1]. Given 
a and b the Nash equilibrium prices are unique and are given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2 36 2 5 2 4 16 3
ˆ ˆ
4 12 5 5
X Y
A A
d a a ab a ab b b
P P
a b
+ + + + + + +
= = + +  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2 36 2 5 2 4 16 3
ˆ ˆ
4 12 5 5
X Y
B B
d b b ba b ba a a
P P
a b
+ + + + + + +
= = + + . 
Nash equilibrium quantities are given by: 
3 2 2 348 24 16ˆ ˆ
96 40 40
X Y
A A
a a b a b ab bQ Q
a b
+ − + − + += = + +  and 
3 2 2 348 24 16ˆ ˆ
96 40 40
X Y
B B
b b a b a ba aQ Q
b a
+ − + − + += = + + . 
Substituting these values into the profit function and differentiating gives the first 
order condition for a as ( )3
( , )
16 12 5 5
d a b
a b
Γ
+ +  where  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )( )
6 5 4
2 3
( , ) 4608 20 258 105 1680 15 82 13
6 12 5 7 10 11 96 768 2 3062 7 171 10
1920 160 720 668 15 12
4608 6432 2208 3868 3 356 15
a b a a b a b b
a b b b a b b b
b b b b b b
a b b b b b
Γ = − + − + + −
+ + + − + + + −
+ + − + + + +
+ − + − + + + +
 
                                                 
6 Throughout the remainder of this paper we assume that the cost of any bundled discount is shared equally 
by firms in a coalition. 
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The symmetric first order condition for b is ( )3
( , )
16 12 5 5
d b a
a b
Γ
+ + . 
First, consider symmetric equilibria. Substituting b = a into the first order 
condition for a gives the first order condition as ( )8 ( ( 12) 1)48 40
a a a d
a
− − −
+ . However, it is easy 
to confirm that this is positive for all [ ]0,1a∈ . Thus the unique symmetric 
equilibrium is the corner solution where a = b = 1. 
Second, consider asymmetric equilibria. From the first order conditions 
for a and b, aˆ  and bˆ  only form a subgame perfect equilibrium if 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) 0a b b aΓ = Γ = . Numerical approximation over [0,1]2 shows that no such 
values of aˆ  and bˆ  exist in the relevant domain. Thus the unique equilibrium 
involves a = b = 1, or in other words, ˆ ˆA B dγ γ= = with symmetric prices and 
quantities. The remainder of the proposition follows from simple substitution 
demonstrating that 32ˆ
i
nP d= , 12ˆ inQ =  and 12ˆ ˆi iA B dπ π= = . 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the outcome under bilateral bundling with independent firms. All 
consumers either buy both products from firms Ai or both products from firms Bi. There 
are no consumers who buy one product from each pair of firms. In this sense, the 
equilibrium bundled discounts are ubiquitous in our model. All consumers receive a 
discount.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
1 
1 
Figure 3: Both Bundle 
y 
x 
X from AX 
Y from AY 
X from BX 
Y from BY 
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It is also clear that bilateral bundling has significant adverse welfare 
consequences in our model. Comparing the outcome with the ‘no bundling’ situation, 
firm profits are unchanged but social welfare is significantly lower under bilateral 
bundling. While each pair of firms sells to exactly one half of the market, consumers are 
wasting surplus by purchasing from firms in less desirable ‘locations’. For example, a 
consumer located at x close to unity but y closer to zero will buy both products of firms 
A. This is despite the fact that purchasing product X from AX imposes a cost of almost d 
on the consumer relative to purchasing product X from BX. The consumer still finds it 
individually desirable to purchase X from AX given that she purchases Y from AY because 
of the size of the bundled discount. This discount, d, more than offsets the personal loss 
associated with purchasing X from the personally less desirable firm.  
Formally, total social welfare in the absence of bundling is given by 12X Yv v d+ − . 
This is divided into total firms’ profits of d with the remaining 32X Yv v d+ −  being 
consumers’ surplus. In contrast, under bilateral bundling, total social welfare is 
2
3X Yv v d+ − , with producers’ profits still equal to d but consumers’ surplus falling to 
5
3X Yv v d+ − . Thus social welfare falls by 16 d  under bilateral bundling relative to no 
bundling. Further, all of this welfare loss falls on the consumers.  
Despite leading to a welfare loss, there are strong pressures on firms to introduce 
bundling. As we have seen from Section 3, unilateral bundling is profitable for firms. 
Thus, if one pair of firms is not going to offer a bundled discount then it always pays the 
other pair of firms to offer such a discount. There is no equilibrium where neither pair of 
firms offers a bundled discount. Further, given that one pair of firms has introduced a 
bundled discount, it always pays the other pair of firms to copy this strategy and also 
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introduce a bundled discount. Given that one pair of firms offers a discount, the profits of 
the other pair of firms rises if they too offer a discount. Thus, offering a bundled discount 
is a dominant strategy for both pairs of firms.  
Our result here contrasts with Chen’s (1997) model of price competition without 
product differentiation, in that both pairs of firms find it optimal to bundle their products. 
However, so far we have not allowed for any integration between pairs of firms. Given 
that bundled discounts create pricing externalities within our model, we would expect 
that coordinated pricing by integrated firms will significantly alter the industry effects of 
bundled discounts.  
5. Integration and Bundling 
In contrast to the above analysis, suppose that pairs of firms can not only offer a 
bundled discount but can also horizontally merge. Such merger does not alter the timing 
of the interaction between firms – pairs of firms still commit to setting bundled discounts 
prior to setting their prices. However, unlike a bundled pair involving two separate firms, 
a single merged firm can explicitly set prices of both product X and Y to maximise total 
profits of the integrated firm. The merger allows for coordinated pricing as well as a 
coordinated bundled discount. There are clearly two situations of interest – where both 
pairs of firms Ai and Bi are merged, and where only one pair of firms is merged.  
Two Integrated Firms 
We first consider the case where there are two integrated firms. There is a single 
firm A that sells both AX and AY and a single firm B that sells both BX and BY. If neither 
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integrated firm offers a bundled discount then the equilibrium is the same as in the non-
integrated base case without bundled discounting. In the absence of discounting, the 
demands for each of the firm’s products are independent so that there is no additional 
benefit from the ability of an integrated firm to coordinate pricing. 
If we consider the bundled discounts offered by A and B, it is easy to show that 
the unique equilibrium involves no bundled discounting. 
Proposition 4. If both AX and AY are integrated and BX and BY are integrated, then the 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involves no bundled discounting. 
PROOF: To show that this is an equilibrium, suppose that B does not set any 
bundled discount and consider firm A’s best response. If A sets 0Aγ >  then 
equilibrium prices are given by 
2
2 4
ˆ ˆ A
A
X Y
A A dP P d
γ
γ += = +  and 22 2ˆ ˆ AX Y dB B dP P γ += = . Firm 
A’s profits are 
2
2
( 2 )1
4 16 ( 2 )
A A
A
d
A A d d
d γ γγπ γ −+= − + . But this is falling in γA. Thus, given that 
firm B is not offering a bundled discount, firm A maximises profits by also 
offering no discount. By symmetry, the same holds for firm B if firm A offers no 
discount. Thus, setting 0A Bγ γ= =  is a mutual best response for the two 
integrated firms. 
To show that this equilibrium is unique, suppose that both A and B set 
positive bundled discounts. A’s profits in this situation are given by 
( )2 2 3
2
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 4 8 ( 4 )
16 ( 2 )
A A B A B A B A
A B
d d d d
A d d
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γπ
+ + − + − + +
+ += . It is easy to verify that for B dγ ≤ , Aπ  
is decreasing in Aγ . Thus, the unique equilibrium is where ˆ ˆ 0A Bγ γ= = .  
 
This proposition mirrors the relevant result from Proposition 1 of Matutes and Regibeau 
(1992).7 Mutual integration changes the benefits from bundled discounting by changing 
the nature of price competition. Price competition is ‘tougher’ under integration when 
one firm offers a discounted bundle than in the absence of integration. This is reflected in 
the prices. As in the non-integrated case, when Aγ  is positive but 0Bγ = , each of iBP  is 
decreasing in Aγ , each iAP  is increasing in Aγ  and X YA A AP P γ+ −  is decreasing in γA. 
                                                 
7 As Matutes and Regibeau show, this result depends on the specific timing of the duopoly interaction.  
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However, in the integrated case, ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 X Y Y X X Y X YA B A B B B A A Ad P P P P P P P P γ> + = + > + = + − . 
Thus, in contrast to the non-integrated case, unilateral bundling under integration lowers 
prices for all consumers.  
The increased intensity of price competition arises under integration because the 
interdependence of pricing is internalised. As discussed in Section 3, bundled discounting 
creates interdependence between prices. Sales of BX are decreasing in YBP  and vice-versa. 
If firms BX and BY are non-integrated and cannot coordinate their prices then this 
interdependence is ignored. Each firm sets its price too high from the perspective of the 
other firm. Under integration, however, this interdependence is internalised, resulting in 
more aggressive pricing by firm B. Further, as can be seen from Section 3 and the prices 
given above, the interdependence in pricing for firms BX and BY is increasing in Aγ . The 
higher is the bundled discount offered by firm A the greater is the cross price effect 
between the products sold by firm B and the more aggressive is the pricing by firm B. 
Bundled discounting is thus self defeating for each firm. It lowers profits because of the 
co-ordinated aggressive response by the rival integrated firm. 
One Integrated Firm 
The analysis above suggests an important asymmetry when only one pair of firms 
is horizontally integrated. Because it can internalise the price interdependency created by 
a bundled discount, an integrated firm will respond aggressively to any discount offered 
by other non-integrated firms, making such discounting unprofitable for those non-
integrated firms. But the reverse does not hold. A non-integrated pair of firms cannot co-
ordinate their pricing response to bundled discounts offered by an integrated firm. From 
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our analysis so far we would expect that this pricing externality would make bundled 
discounting profitable for the integrated firm. Thus, we would expect that if only one pair 
of firms is integrated, those firms would have a strong incentive to offer bundled 
discounts to create and exploit a pricing externality between the non-integrated firms. 
The non-integrated firms would not, however, find it profitable to respond by creating 
their own discounted bundle because this would lead to a strong response by the 
integrated rival.  
Proposition 5 confirms this intuition. 
Proposition 5. If AX and AY are integrated but BX and BY are not integrated then:  
(1) Regardless of the level of γA, BX and BY always set 0Bγ = ;  
(2) The integrated firm offers a bundled discount. However, compared with 
the unilateral bundling case, the discount is lower, headline prices are 
lower but market share of the integrated firm is higher under integration 
by a single pair of firms. 
PROOF: Let A adγ =  and B bdγ = where both a and b are elements of [0,1]. 
Solving for the first order conditions in prices where A jointly sets XAP  and 
Y
AP  to 
maximize the total profit of firm A given the bundled discounts, and each firm B 
sets its own price to unilaterally maximise its own profits given the bundled 
discounts, gives equilibrium prices as: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 3
2
2 4 6 16 7 6 16 3
4 10 4 6 2 4
ˆ ˆ a a a ab a ab b b dX Y
A A a a b b b
P P
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + += =  
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2
2
48 5 2 16 9 5 44 18 5
4 10 4 6 2 4
ˆ ˆ a b a b b b b b dX Y
B B a a b b b
P P
+ + + + + + +
+ + + += =  
and equilibrium quantities as: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
3 3 2
2
2 48 16 16 2 3 96 32 4 3
8 2 5 4 3 2 4
ˆ ˆ a b b b b a b b a b b bX Y
A A a a b b b
Q Q
+ + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + += =  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( )
3 3 2
2
2 48 8 8 3 8 4 2 3
8 2 5 4 3 2 4
ˆ ˆ b b b a b b b a b a b bX Y
B B a a b b b
Q Q
+ + − + − + + − − +
+ + + + += =  
Substituting these values into the profit equations and maximising the joint profits 
of XB  and YB with respect to b, gives a first order condition that is negative for all 
d and for all , [0,1]a b∈ . Thus, for any value of d and any feasible values of a the 
optimal value of b is always equal to zero. This proves (1).  
(2) is shown by substitution and maximisation with regards to a; yielding, 
ˆ 0.25981A dγ = , ˆ ˆ 1.05444X YA AP P d= = , ˆ ˆ 0.959966X YB BP P d= = , 
ˆ ˆ 0.5441X YA AQ Q= = , ˆ ˆ 0.479983X YB BQ Q= = , * 1.01064A dπ = and 
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* * 0.460768
X YB B
dπ π= =  and the proposed comparisons with the unilateral 
bundling case. 
 
It is useful to note here that the bundled discount offered by the integrated firm here is 
less than the discount that is unilaterally offered by non-integrated firms. However, as we 
would expect, due to the price coordination created by integration, the prices XAP  and 
Y
AP  
are also lower than in the non-integrated case leading to a reduction in XBP  and 
Y
BP . Thus, 
all (headline) prices are lower in the integrated case, although those customers buying a 
single product from A face a (slightly) higher price. Nonetheless, overall welfare is lower 
in the integrated case, as the integrated firm’s market share is above that it would achieve 
if it were not integrated. 
Incentives and Effects of Integration 
The above results allow us to consider the incentives for horizontal integration by 
firms selling unrelated products. Suppose that prior to negotiating on bundled discounts, 
each pair of firms simultaneously chooses whether or not to horizontally integrate. When 
bundled discounting is preceded by horizontal integration, the unique equilibrium 
outcome involves both firms merging with no horizontal discounting. If neither pair 
integrated then both pairs of firms would offer bundled discounts with total pair-wise 
profits of d. But in this situation, it would pay one pair to pre-empt the other pair and 
merge. The merged pair would still engage in bundled discounting but the non-integrated 
pair would not find it profitable to bundle. However, the profits of the non-merged pair of 
firms falls in this situation, leading to incentives for them to also merge. In equilibrium, 
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both pairs merge but there are no bundled discounts. The outcome from the consumers’ 
perspective is the same as in the absence of integration and bundled discounts.  
This analysis suggests that merger might be used as a defensive strategy in the 
presence of bundled discounting. In the absence of horizontal integration, if one pair of 
firms begins to discount then the other pair of firms can either respond by also 
discounting or by merging. So long as the bundled discount is reversible, integration will 
promote an aggressive pricing response and result in the initial bundling being 
unprofitable. Of course, an equivalent response (in terms of profits) would be for one pair 
of firms to respond to the other pair’s bundled discount by matching that discount. In this 
sense, either integration or matching bundled discounts could be used as defensive 
strategies to the introduction of a bundled discount by one pair of firms. Of course, the 
welfare consequences of these alternative responses differ significantly. Mutual 
integration leads to no bundled discounts and an efficient allocation of customers 
between firms. No integration with bundled discounts results in an inefficient allocation 
of customers. Firms make the same profit is both cases but welfare is significantly lower 
with bundled discounts and no horizontal integration.   
6. Conclusions 
The strategy of introducing bundled discounts to encourage customer loyalty has 
become widespread. This paper demonstrates why. Even for unrelated products, a 
bundled discount has the effect of tying customers to particular product brands and 
improving the profitability of the firms involved. However, once the full competitive 
responses are included, the net effect on profits is zero although the allocation of 
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customers to brands is dramatically altered. In the case of supermarket-gas deals, in 
equilibrium, many customers find themselves consuming one type of product potentially 
far away from their most preferred brand. To the extent that physical location drives 
those choices, those customers will incur higher transport costs. 
For this reason, we believe that bundled discounts of unrelated products should be 
regarded with suspicion. In contrast to some statements by regulators (e.g., ACCC, 2004), 
a bundled discount cannot in itself be considered a pro-competitive act as one also has to 
take into account the effect on headline prices. Our paper has demonstrated that those 
headline prices adjust (perhaps fully) for the discount; leaving only distorted customer 
choices. Ironically, when the unrelated products are sold by the same firm, this reduces 
the incentives for welfare-reducing bundling. Indeed, merger is a potential commitment 
device against the distorted pricing strategy. 
While our model is simple, the widespread existence and introduction of bundled 
discounts suggests an opportunity for empirical testing. Bundled arrangements will be 
introduced over time by different firms in an industry. The effect on prices can therefore 
by discerned by examining their movement in response to the timing of bundling events. 
This variation will also assist in establishing whether the driving forces of consumer 
harm as a result of bundling actually exist. However, that empirical exercise is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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